PART1 MILITARY LEADERSHIP STYLE CASE NUMBER 1 State Loses Control Over Its Nuclear Weapons Illustrative Scenario: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) DPRK Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Missile Sites The DPRK’s WMD and missile programs include approximately 141 sites(excluding tactical sites) identified as being of potential interest for WMD-Eoperations, 39 of which are associated with its nuclear program, 38 are related toits CW program, and 15 are additional 49 sites are associated with the related to its bio weapons (BW) program. An ballistic missiles that might launchWMD. For WMD-E operations, we assess that the order of priority of these sites wouldbe: 1.Nuclear fuel enriching and processing sites, and nuclear weaponmanufacturing,testing, and storagesites 2. Missile garrisons holding missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons 3. Research and development sites and nuclear-related universities 4. Other nuclear sites—including mines, low-grade or processing 5.Biological weapons research and development, manufacturing, testing,andstorage sites 6.CW research and development, manufacturing, testing, and storage sites.Unclassified sources identify nine sites in the DPRK that fall into the first category: by on Nuclear Research Center, one nuclear test site, four additional undeclared enrichmentsites, one suspected undergroundnuclear storage site, one undeclared underground enrichment and reprocessingsite, and one site associated with nuclear weaponization.These nine nuclear sites are shown in Figure 1.1. The figure also depicts a notional buffer line that might be established byChinese forces—50 km in this example—in the event that China decides to establish a zone within North Korea to control the flow of refugees or other wisemanage further developments on the peninsula. An interesting feature of such a zone would be the number of priority WMD and missile sites remaining outsideit. In this notional case, five nuclear and seven missile sites would remain onthe U.S. side. 5